Seen a curious piece of news today. As a short preamble, an aircraft in the U.S. may receive useful information from a ground station (TIS-B and FIS-B), but it has to transmit a certain ADS-B packet for that to happen. And all ADS-B packets include a field that specifies the system's claim that it operates according to a certain level of precision and integrity. The idea is, roughly, if you detect that e.g. one of your redundant GPS receivers is off-line, you should broadcast that you're downgraded. The protocol field is called SIL. The maximum level you can claim is determined by how crazily redundant and paranoid your design is. We are talking something in the order of $20,000 worth of cost, most of which is amortization of FAA paperwork certifying and you are entitled to claim SIL of 2. I lied about this explanation being short, BTW.
So, apparently, NavWorks shipped cheap ADS-B boxes, which were made with a Raspberry Pie and a cellphone GPS chip (or such). They honestly transmitted a SIL of 0. Who cares, right? Well, FAA decided that TIS should stop to reply to airplanes flying around with a SIL Zero ADS-B boxes, because fuck the citizens, they should pay their $20k. Pilots called the NavWorks and complained that their iPads hooked to ADS600 do not display the weather reliably anymore. NavWorks issued a software update that programmed their boxes to transmit SIL of 2. No other change: the actual transmitted positions remained exactly as before, only the claimed reliability was faked. When FAA got the wind of this happening, they went nuclear on NavWorks users' asses. The proposed emergency directive orders owners to remove the offending equipment from their aircraft. They are grounded until the compliance.
Now the good thing is, the ADS-B mandate comes in 2020. They still have 3 years to find a more compliant (and expensive) supplier, before they are prohibited from a vicinity of a major city. So it's only money.
I don't have a dog in this fight, personally, so I can sympathize with both the bureaucrats who saw cheaters and threw a book at them, and the company that employed a workaround against a meaningless and capricious rule. However, here's a couple of observations.
First, note how FAA maintains a database of individual (not aggregate) protocol compliance for each ADS-B ID. They will even helpfully send you a report about what they know about you (it's intended so you can test the performance your ADS-B equipment). Imagine if the government saved every query that your browser made, and could tell if your Chrome were not compliant with a certain RFC. This detailed tracking of everything is actually very necessary because the protocol has no encryption whatsoever and is trivially spoofed. Nothing stops a bad actor to use your ID in ADS-B. The only recourse is for the government to investigate reported issues and find the culprit. And they need the absolute tracking for it.
Second, about the 2020 mandate. The airspace prohibition amounts to not letting someone into a city if the battery is flat in their EZ-pass transponder. Only in this case, the government sent you a letter saying that your transponder is banned, and you must buy a new one before you can get to work. In theory, your freedom of travel is not limited - you can take a bus. In practice though, not everyone has $20k, and the waiting list for the installer is 6 months.
UPDATE 2016/12/19: NavWorx posted the following explanation on their website (no permalink, idiots):
Our version 4.0.6 made our 12/13 products transmit SIL 3, which the FAA ground stations would recognize as sufficient to resume sending TIS-B traffic to our customers.
Fortunately from product inception our internal GPS met SIL 3 performance. The FAA approved our internal GPS as SIL 3. During the TSO certification process, the FAA accepted our “compliance matrix” – which is the FAA’s primary means of compliance - showing our internal GPS integrity was 1x10-7, which translates to SIL of 3. However, FAA policy at that time was that ADS-B GPS must have its own separate TSO – our internal GPS was certified under TSO-C154c, the same as the UAT OUT/IN transceiver. It’s important to note that the FAA authorized us to certify our internal GPS in this manner, and that they know that our internal GPS is safe – applicants for TSO certification must present a project plan and the FAA reviews and approves this project plan before the FAA ever allows an applicant to proceed with TSO certification of any product. Although they approved our internal GPS to be SIL of 3 (integrity of 1x10-7), based on FAA policy at the time they made us transmit SIL 0, with the explanation that “uncertified GPS must transmit SIL 0”. This really is a misnomer, as our GPS is “certified” (under TSO-C154c), but the FAA refers to it as “uncertified”. The FAA AD states that “uncertified” GPS must transmit SIL of 0.
So, basically, they never bothered to certify their GPS properly and used a fig leaf of TSO-C154c.
The letter then goes on how unfair it is that all the shitty experimentals are allowed to signal SIL 3 if only they use a proper GPS.
UPDATE 2016/12/20: AOPA weighs in a comment on NPRM:
Specifically, AOPA recommends the FAA address the confusion over whether the internal position source meets the applicable performance requirements, the existence of an unsafe condition, and why the proposed AD applies to NavWorx’s experimental UAT model.
The FAA requires a position source to meet the performance requirements in appendix B to AC 20-165B for the position source to be included in the ADS-B Out system and for an aircraft to meet the § 91.227(c) performance requirements (e.g., SIL = 3). The FAA does not require the position source be compliant with a specific TSO. Any person may demonstrate to the FAA that its new (uncertified) position source meets the requirements of appendix B to AC 20-165B, thereby qualifying that position source to be used in an ADS-B Out system. However, integrating a TSO-certified position source into a UAT means that a person will have fewer requirements to satisfy in AC 20-165B appendix B during the STC process for the ADS-B Out system.
Around May 2014, the FAA issued NavWorx an STC for its ADS600-B UAT with part numbers 200-0012 and 200-0013 (Certified UATs). The STC allowed for the installation of those UATs into any type-certificated aircraft identified in the approved model list. The Certified UATs were compliant with TSO-C154c, but had internal, non-compliant GPS receivers. (ADS600-B Installation Manual 240-0008-00-36 (IM -36), at 17, 21, 28.) Specifically, section 2.3 of NavWorx’s March 2015 installation manual states:
“For ADS600-B part numbers 200-0012 and 200-0013, the internal GPS WAAS receiver does not meet 14 CFR 91 FAA-2007-29305 for GPS position source. If the ADS600-B is configured to use the internal GPS as the position source the ADS-B messages transmitted by the unit reports: A Source Integrity Limit (SIL) of 0 indicating that the GPS position source does not meet the 14 CFR 91 FAA-2007-29305 rule.” (IM -36, at 19.)
Hoo, boy. Per the above quote by AOPA, NavWorks previously admitted in writing that their internal GPS is not good enough, but they are trying to walk that back with the talk about "GPS integrity 1x10-7".
In the same comment letter later, Justin T. Barkowski recommends to minimize the economic impact in the rulemaking and not force owners to pull NavWorx boxes out of the aircraft immediately.